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We criticise existing empirical results on the detrimental effects of natural resource 
dependence on the rate of economic growth after controlling for institutional quality, 
openness and initial income. These results do not survive once we use instrumental variables 
to correct for the endogenous nature of the explanatory variables. Furthermore, they suffer 
from omitted variables bias as they over-estimate the effect of initial income per capita and 
thus under-estimate the speed of conditional convergence. Instead, we provide new evidence 
for the impact of natural resource dependence on income per capita in a systematic empirical 
cross-country framework. In addition to a significant negative direct impact of natural 
resources on income per capita, we find significant indirect effect of natural resources on 
institutions. We allow for interaction effects and provide evidence that the natural resource 
curse is particularly severe for economic performance in countries with a low degree of trade 
openness. Adopting policies directed toward more trade openness may thus soften the impact 
of a resource curse. We also check the robustness of our results by using a variety of 
instruments and also employing the ratio of natural capital rather than natural resource exports 
to national income as an explanatory variable. We find evidence that resource abundance, 
measured by the stock of natural capital, also induces a resource curse, but less severely for 
countries that are relatively open. 
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1. Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence in the press and elsewhere suggests that resource-rich countries often fall 
victim to a ‘resource curse’. Resource-rich countries such as Congo, Nigeria, Bolivia, Sierra 
Leone and Venezuela fared much worse than resource-poor countries like the Asian Tigers. 
Countries with a large share of natural resource exports typically have a relatively low income 
per capita, but there are notable exceptions. For example, Fasano (2002) documents that the 
United Arab Emirates have turned the resource curse into a blessing by investing in modern 
infrastructure and education. Also, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) argue that 
ethnically homogenous and diamond-rich Botswana is a success story as it also uses resource 
revenues to invest massively in education and growth. Still, there is a wealth of systematic 
cross-country evidence suggesting that countries with large exports of natural resources have 
a worse growth performance than countries with little or no natural resources after correcting 
for the investment-GDP ratio, openness and institutional quality as well as the initial level of 
income per capita. Most of these studies are based on the seminal work of Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1997, 2001). An interesting extension is provided by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
(2005).
2 They argue and provide some evidence that resource dependence only affects growth 
performance adversely in countries with bad institutions (e.g., a poorly defined legal system 
or a high risk of expropriation), but may even boost growth in countries with good institutions. 
This literature is very interesting and potentially relevant from a policy point of view, but 
nevertheless suffers from a number of very serious shortcomings. 
  First, Sachs and Warner argue that resource dependence induces an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate which leads to a decline of traded sector activity. If the traded sector 
enjoys more learning by doing than the sheltered sector, resource dependence harms growth.
3 
The problem is that the evidence for this interpretation of the resource curse is at best mixed 
and ignores other potentially more promising political economy explanations of the resource 
curse. The main ones that are offered in the literature are that substantial natural resource 
exports may worsen institutional quality and thus harm growth prospects and that resource 
dependence may aggravate the adverse effects of bad institutions on growth performance. For 
example, Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) highlight the voracity effect. 
In the absence of well-defined property rights, natural resources introduce a common pool 
problem and elicit rapacious rent seeking. As a result, a wealth of natural resources can 
hamper economic growth. Ross (1999), Baland and Francois (2000), Auty (2001), Busby et al. 
                                                 
2 Other examples are Mansano and Rigobon (2001) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). Isham 
et. al. (2003), Murshed (2004) and Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) provide evidence that point-
based (geographically more clustered) resources harm growth more than diffuse natural resources. 
3 These arguments were based on van Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987). Earlier work on the 
Dutch Disease by Forsyth and Kay (1980), Bruno and Sachs (1982), Neary and Purvis (1982) and 
Corden (1984) also discuss the decline of the traded sector, but learning by doing externalities are 
needed to have a rationale for government intervention.   2
(2002), Isham et al. (2003), Torvik (2002), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005), Robinson, 
Torvik and Verdier (2006), Wick and Bulte (2006), Caselli (2006) and many others also put 
forward political economy explanations of how natural resource dependence invites rent 
seeking and corruption and thus harms the economy.
4  Other explanations of the resource 
curse highlight that resource abundance erodes the critical faculties of politicians and tends to 
keep bad policies in place. For example, Mansoorian (1991) and Mansano and Rigobon (2001) 
argue that countries rich in natural resources have a tendency to borrow excessively, 
especially if resources fetch a high price on international markets. However, once resources 
run out or if resource prices fall, they end up with financial crises that have dire consequences 
for economic growth. Countries rich in natural resources may also make the mistake of 
building a generous welfare state, which is not sustainable when natural resources run out.
5 
Perhaps the most relevant example of natural resources engendering bad policies is when they 
generate political pressure to protect non-resource export sectors from the vigour of 
international competition, especially if they are hurt by the real appreciation of the exchange 
rate caused by substantial natural resource exports. Natural resource dependence may thus 
play a role in keeping restrictive trade policies in place, which in turn may harm growth 
prospects. The empirical resource curse literature thus suffers from the problem that it makes 
no serious attempt to disentangle what the main channels are by which substantial natural 
resource exports may harm economic growth. There is ample evidence that resource 
dependence hurts growth prospects, but it is unclear whether this is due to forsaking learning 
by doing, worsening institutions or keeping bad policies in place. It is also unclear whether 
natural resources are the root cause of bad institutions and bad policies or whether they 
aggravate the adverse effects of bad institutions and bad policies on economic growth. 
Without more information on the channels by which resources affect growth, the empirical 
evidence will be of limited use to policy makers. 
Second, from an econometric point of view, the empirical evidence for the resource 
curse is flawed as no allowance is made for the endogenous character of explanatory variables 
such as the quality of institutions or the degree of the economy’s openness.
6 This is in sharp 
contrast to the ever-growing literature on explaining differences in countries’ income per 
capita, where the main effort lies in the search for good instruments in order to disentangle the 
direction of causation and correct for endogenous explanatory variables. For example, 
                                                 
4 Some of these are based on the seminal work on the productive and unproductive use of talent by 
Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1993) and on earlier work on corruption and growth by Mauro (1995) 
and Bardhan (1997). The pioneering work of North (1990) on the importance of good institutions for 
good growth importance has been a significant source of inspiration as well. 
5 The Netherlands have used the revenues from the Slochteren gas source to build up an unsustainable 
welfare state during the 1970s and 1980s, which has taken many administrations to turn back. 
6 Lederman and Maloney (2002) allow for endogeneity and different time periods and cannot reproduce 
the results of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). However, they only have a sample of 19 to 37 countries.    3
Acemoglu and others (2001) stress the usefulness of colonial origins and settler mortality 
rates as instruments that affect institutional quality but not differences in income per capital 
directly. A much larger sample is possible if institutional quality is instrumented by the 
fraction of the population speaking English or Western European languages as a first 
language as in Hall and Jones (1999). Frankel and Romer (1999) use gravity equations for 
bilateral trade flows as instruments for international trade. Using this diverse set of 
instruments, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) conduct a ‘horse race.’ They find that 
institutions trump geography/climate and openness in explaining cross-country variations in 
income per capita, but geography/climate may affect income per capita indirectly through the 
quality of institutions.
7 It is a serious defect of the empirical literature on the resource curse 
that it does not use instruments for institutions and trade and thus ends up with biased and 
misleading estimates. Furthermore, the existing literature on the resource curse does not 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the effect of resource dependence on institutional 
quality, and, on the other hand, the interaction effect of resource dependence and institutional 
quality. Of course, this is related to the problem of not being able to address the question of 
what the channel is by which substantial natural resource revenues affect cross-country 
differences in income per capita. Furthermore, there is no evidence to explain the various 
channels by which substantial natural resource revenues may affect growth. 
Third, as Islam (1995) has argued convincingly, cross-country regressions suffer from 
omitted variable bias. They do not allow for a correlation between the initial level of 
productivity and past income per capita. Since the correlation with past income per capita is 
likely to be positive, the coefficient on lagged income per capita is likely to be overestimated. 
As a result, cross-country regressions yield an underestimate of the speed of adjustment and 
an overestimate of the share of capital. As also pointed out by Parente and Prescott (1994), 
cross-country regressions can thus not explain ‘growth miracles’ as the high capital share 
implies unrealistically slow adjustment speeds. One way out is to drop lagged income per 
capita and focus on explaining income per capita. A better solution is perhaps to use a panel 
regression in order to avoid these biases. 
The purpose of this paper is to remedy, with the limited macro data we have at our 
disposal, some of the shortcomings mentioned above. We thus re-examine the cross-country 
evidence based on the seminal work of Sachs and Warner with an extended dataset. Section 2 
provides the OLS estimates of the original Sachs and Warner result that natural resources 
negatively affect growth even after allowing for the positive growth effects of the investment-
                                                 
7 Sachs (2003) disagrees and demonstrates that malaria transmission, strongly affected by ecological 
conditions, directly affects the level of income per capita after controlling for the quality of institutions. 
Malaria risk is instrumented by an index of malaria ecology (based on temperature, species abundance, 
etc.), which predicts malaria risk well.   4
GDP ratio, institutional quality and openness. Section 2 confirms Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
(2005) and finds empirical evidence that resource dependence only negatively affects growth 
performance in countries where institutional quality is worse than a critical value. However, 
we also find support for the idea that the natural resource curse is less severe in countries with 
less restrictive trade policies.
8 Interestingly, if we extend the sample period, the interaction 
term with institutional quality becomes insignificant while the interaction term with trade 
openness remains significant at the 5% level. The natural resource curse may even become a 
blessing for very open economies. In section 3 we re-estimate these equations where we 
instrument institutional quality and openness with bilateral trade shares, distance to equator, 
settler mortality rates, legal origin and fraction of population speaking English. We find that 
the results of section 2 do not stand up to such scrutiny for a wide variety of instruments. 
Furthermore, we find that the conditional speed of convergence implied by the estimates is 
unrealistically small. Section 4 therefore chooses a different tack. It takes as a starting point 
the literature that explains cross-country variations in income per capita in terms of 
institutions, openness and geography. Adding natural resource exports as an additional 
explanatory variable, we find evidence of a negative effect of resource exports on income per 
capita. We also find evidence of interaction terms, which imply that the natural resource curse 
particularly harms income per capita in countries with bad institutions or bad policies. When 
we estimate with IV rather than OLS, we find that the results stand up although the estimates 
are less precisely determined. Section 5 replaces the traditional flow measure of resource 
dependence (i.e., share of exports of natural resources in GNI) by the World Bank’s recent 
stock estimates of natural capital (World Bank, 2006b). This allows one to study the effects of 
natural resource abundance rather than dependence. We find that resource abundance 
depresses income per capita, but less severely for countries that are relatively open. Section 6 
checks robustness with respect to alternative measures of institutional quality. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Effects of resource dependence on growth performance: OLS estimates 
The identification of which policies matter most in turning natural resource dependence in a 
blessing is a key empirical question. Institutional quality and trade openness have been put 
forward as fundamental factors in driving income per capita differences. The presence of 
substantial natural resource exports is likely to affect both these factors. Indeed, the presence 
of natural resources is likely to generate corruption, poor rule of law and conflicts (both 
internal and external). On the impact of natural resources on trade, one needs to investigate 
both the static impact of the presence of natural resources on the openness of a country and its 
                                                 
8 This related to empirical evidence that foreign aid has a positive effect on economic growth in 
countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).   5
feedback effect on trade policies. The presence of natural resources is also likely to have a 
differentiated impact on growth, which depends on pre-existing conditions such as the quality 
of institutions or the economy’s degree of openness. One also needs to investigate whether the 
presence of natural resources is also likely to have an impact on the most proximate sources 
of growth, such as education and infrastructure that could help explain the relationship 
between natural resources and growth.  
 
Table 1 presents the OLS regressions for growth in income per capita over the period 1965 to 
1990 (i.e., GrowthGDP6590 in Appendix A). This sample period allows us to make a 
comparison with earlier tests of the natural resource curse done by Sachs and Warner (1995, 
1997) and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005). Regression (1) confirms the classic result of 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). It shows that conditional growth performance is better for 
poor countries than rich countries, since growth depends negatively on initial income per 
capita. This is, of course, a direct result of the assumption of decreasing returns to capital in 
production. The time it takes to reduce a given income gap by 50 percent is 84 years (see 
Appendix B).
9 This seems implausibly large and may be the result of omitted variable bias 
arising from the positive correlation between the initial level of productivity and past income 
per capita as suggested by Islam (1995). More interestingly, growth performance depends also 
positively on de jure openness of the economy and negatively on the share of natural 
resources in exports. This has become known in the literature as the ‘natural resource curse’. 
  It may be that natural resource dependence is a proxy for bad institutions. However, 
regression (2) indicates that if we also allow for institutional quality as an explanatory 
variable, we find that growth performance is also positively affected by the quality of 
institutions. Furthermore, we find that the natural resource curse survives. This suggests that 
natural resource dependence is associated with factors not captured by the other explanatory 
variables. For example, resource dependence may lead to low human capital accumulation or 
less learning by doing in the non-resource export sectors resulting from a fall in 
competitiveness as suggested by the standard Dutch disease story (e.g., van Wijnbergen, 
1984; Krugman, 1987). Interestingly, regression (3) shows that once cross-country differences 
in ratios of investment to national income are taken into account, institutional quality is no 
longer significant. Still, the natural resource curse survives and investment is an important 
driver of growth performance. Clearly, poorer countries have to make ends meet to survive, 
and thus are less able to save and have to cope with a miserable growth performance. The half 
time to close a given income gap is 44 years, which seems more plausible. 
                                                 
9 κ=0.744, t2 − t1 = 25, so θ = 1 − 25 x 0.744/100 = 0.814 and T = − 25 log(2)/log(0.814) = 84.2 years.   6
  Regression (4) confirms the results of Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005). The 
interactive effect with institutional quality is significant at the 5% level, albeit that 
institutional quality itself has the right sign but is significant at the 5% level. This finding 
suggests that good institutions can turn the natural resource curse into a blessing. The net 
effect of natural resource exports on growth performance is given by −14.361 + 1.540 x 
InstQual80. Hence, in countries with a high level of institutional quality (i.e., InstQual80 > 
9.325), substantial natural resource exports enhance growth performance. This is the case for 
the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and 
United States. However, if institutional quality is poor (InstQual80 < 9.325), natural resources 
are a curse for economic growth. Most of the natural resource rents are then likely to corrupt 
officials and rent seekers instead of being put to good use by productive entrepreneurs. 
Regression (4) also indicates that growth performance is better for more open economies with 
a low initial income per capita and a high investment rate. 
 
 
However, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that a trade policy aimed at more exposure to 
foreign competition and transfer of technology, managerial skills and know how from abroad 
might turn the natural resource curse into a blessing as well. Regression (6) indicates that if 
we extend regression (4) and also allow for an interaction term of natural resource openness 
with de jure openness, it is not significant. However, regression (5) suggests that there might 
be such an interaction term with de jure openness if the interaction term with institutional 
quality is dropped, but then the effect of institutional quality on growth performance becomes 
even more poorly determined. Institutional quality and de jure openness may proxy similar 
Table 1: OLS Regression for Growth in Income Per Capita Over the Period 1965–90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logGDP/cap65 -0.733 -1.028 -1.284 -1.259 -1.277 -1.258 -1.209
(3.62)** (4.39)** (6.68)** (6.73)** (6.70)** (6.68)** (6.93)**
OPEN6590 3.217 2.492 1.451 1.654 0.906 1.706 1.160
(7.75)** (4.99)** (3.37)** (3.88)** (1.64) (2.44)* (2.23)*
PrimExp/GNP -5.470 -5.755 -6.692 -14.361 -7.907 -14.540 -7.766
(3.76)** (3.80)** (5.44)** (4.24)** (5.46)** (3.72)** (5.49)**
InstQual80 0.223 0.059 -0.134 0.073 -0.142
(2.05)* (0.65) (1.12) (0.81) (0.96)
InvRate7089 0.150 0.156 0.153 0.156 0.154
(6.73)** (7.16)** (6.90)** (7.11)** (7.46)**
Interact OPEN6590 5.089 -0.413 7.210
(1.55) (0.09)   (2.36)*
Constant 7.172 8.674 9.603 10.302 9.610 10.327 9.259
(4.52)** (5.25)** (7.17)** (7.73)** (7.24)** (7.56)** (7.17)**
Interact InstQual80 1.540 1.596
(2.42)* (1.82)
Observations 96 87 87 87 87 87 96
R-squared 0.50 0.55 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.69
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.    7
things. The resulting collinearity can explain why the interaction terms are not statistically 
significant in regression (6). We therefore decide to drop institutional quality and its 
interactions term with natural resource exports altogether.  
The resulting regression (7) suggests that growth performance is positively affected 
by openness and investment rates, but negatively affected by the initial income per capita. The 
net effect of natural resource exports on growth performance is −7.766 + 7.210 OPEN6590, 
which is always negative as OPEN6590 never exceeds 1.00. This indicates that the natural 
resource curse is less severe for countries with de jure more open economies. Hence, 
countries that have state monopolies of major exports, black market exchange rate premiums 
higher than 20 percent, average tariff rates higher than 40 percent and quotas covering more 
than 40 percent of imports suffer much more from the natural resource curse than countries 
with less restrictive trade policies.
10 Resource dependence may elicit a strong lobby from the 
non-resource export sectors for protection from competition from imports. In that case, the 
interaction term suggests that resource dependence indicates the extent to which this happens 
and hampers growth performance. 
It is of some interest to examine how the results in Table 1 stand up to an extension of the 
sample period. Table 2 therefore presents the OLS regressions for growth in income per 
capita over the period 1965 to 2000 (i.e., GrowthGDP19652000 in Appendix A). The basic 
regression (1) again confirms the results in Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) that the share of 
natural resources in exports and the initial level of income per capita have a negative effect on 
growth performance while openness has a positive effect on growth performance. Regression 
(2) adds institutional quality as an explanatory variable, which is of the right sign but no 
longer statistically significant. Furthermore, regression (3) indicates again that institutional 
quality drops out completely once we add the investment rate as an explanatory variable. 
Regression (4) shows that the interaction term of the share of natural resources in exports with 
institutional quality is no longer significant at the 5% level either. Hence, the results of 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005) are not robust to extending the sample period. Perhaps the 
reason is that rising natural prices during the 1990s have provided a surplus that made up for 
bad institutions in some resource-rich countries. Alternatively, the 1990s may have seen 
improvements in the institutional quality of resource-rich countries that have been relatively 
open to trade, enjoy high levels of press freedom and high levels of education, and do not 
receive much foreign aid as argued by the IMF (2005). 
  Regression (5) and (6) indicate that the interaction term with de jure openness may be 
more promising. Indeed, regression (7) which drops institutional quality and its interaction 
                                                 
10 The Sachs and Warner (1997) openness indicator, OPEN6590, is constructed using those variables as 
subcomponents.   8
term with natural resources, shows that the interaction term of the share of natural resources 
in exports with de jure openness has the right sign and is significant at the 5% level. The 
effect of natural resources on the average growth in income per capita equals −4.4 + 7.2 
OPEN6590, so that the natural resource curse is less severe for countries that do not have 
restrictive trade policies or extractive state monopolies on major exports. In fact, for relatively 
open economies with OPEN6590 larger than 0.61, the resource curse is turned into a blessing. 
This is the case for the rich OECD countries, but also for Bolivia, Indonesia, Jordan, Ecuador, 
Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia. Alas, it is not the case for most resource-rich countries 
on the African continent.  
 
 
Summing up, we cast doubt on the evidence put forward by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
(2005) for the hypothesis that the natural resource curse can be turned into a blessing for 
countries with high institutional quality. Regression (4) indicates that their results do not stand 
up to extending the sample period. Institutional quality and its interaction with natural 
resource exports are no longer statistically significant. In any case, it has been argued by 
Glaeser and others (2004) that the available indicators of institutional quality may not be 
appropriate. They relate more to outcomes than true exogenous de jure measures of 
institutional quality. Dropping institutional quality avoids endogeneity bias arising from the 
measurement of institutional quality. We therefore prefer to use de jure openness as an 
explanatory variable. Regression (7) provides new evidence that the natural resource curse is 
less severe in countries that are more open to international trade. Also, growth performance is 
higher for countries that start with a low level of income per capita and invest a lot.  
 
Table 2. OLS Regressions for Growth in Income Per Capita Over the Period 1965–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logGDP/worker65 -0.356 -0.542 -0.607 -0.605 -0.605 -0.606 -0.545
(1.92) (2.61)* (3.22)** (3.20)** (3.24)** (3.22)** (3.23)**
OPEN6590 2.572 2.064 1.109 1.195 0.431 0.316 0.544
(5.96)** (3.74)** (2.04)* (2.15)* (0.61) (0.35) (0.87)
PrimExp/GNP -3.690 -4.245 -3.697 -7.145 -5.115 -4.157 -4.389
(2.40)* (2.54)* (2.44)* (1.66) (2.89)** (0.85) (2.69)**
InstQual80 0.129 0.017 -0.070 0.033 0.063
(1.14) (0.16) (0.48) (0.31) (0.35)
InvShare19702000 0.120 0.123 0.125 0.125 0.132
(4.32)** (4.38)** (4.51)** (4.47)** (5.17)**
Interact OPEN6590 6.159 6.942 7.193
(1.51) (1.25) (2.02)*
Constant 4.489 5.712 5.277 5.650 5.303 5.183 4.671
(2.83)** (3.42)** (3.49)** (3.59)** (3.54)** (3.21)** (3.35)**
Interact InstQual80 0.699 -0.231
(0.86) (0.21)
Observations 92 83 83 83 83 83 92
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.    9
Natural resources potentially affect growth performance through at least five channels: (i) 
directly through the Dutch disease channel; (ii) indirectly in the longer term through a 
worsening of institutional quality (e.g., war, internal conflict, deterioration of institutions after 
the discovery of  natural resources), (iii) indirectly through a more restrictive trade policy in 
response to a decline in the non-resource export sectors; (iv) through an interaction term with 
institutional quality; and (v) through an interaction term with de jure openness. Indeed, Sachs 
and Warner (1997) argue that the Dutch disease effect corresponds to the residual effect of 
natural resource exports (i) once the indirect effect of natural resources on de jure openness is 
taken account of (iii).  In fact, we find that there is evidence of a direct Dutch disease channel 
(i) and (v) in the explanation of cross-country differences in growth performance, even after 
allowing for channels (ii), (iii) and (iv).  
The results obtained in Tables 1 and 2 underestimate the speed of conditional 
convergence. Furthermore, these results can be criticised as some of the explanatory variables 
are clearly endogenous. We therefore turn to IV estimates of the effects of the natural 
resource curse on growth performance. 
 
3. Effects of resource dependence on growth performance: IV estimates 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) use IV regressions to explain cross-country 
variations in income per capita rather than growth performance. They find that institutions are 
more important in explaining income per capita than geography/climate and openness. It is 
therefore of interest to reconsider our OLS estimates of the natural resource curse presented in 
section 2 and to examine how they stand up under IV estimation. In this way we try to correct 
for the endogenous nature of explanatory variables such as institutional quality and openness. 
We use the gravity equations of Frankel and Romer (1999) to instrument openness. We 
employ the colonial settler mortality data used by Acemoglu and others (2001) as an 
instrument for institutional quality. Colonial empires robbed states of their natural resources 
in which indigenous diseases were rife and survival prospects were poor, and thus did not 
invest in good institutions. We separately use data on the fraction of the population speaking 
English or Western European languages as a first language used by Hall and Jones (1999) to 
instrument institutional quality. This has the advantage that it permits a much larger sample. 
The IV approach requires that the instruments be valid, but it may be quite hard to 
come up with truly exogenous instruments that also satisfy the exclusion restriction (i.e., that 
do not affect the dependent variable directly, but only through the explanatory variables they 
are being used to instrument). Since there are very few potential instruments, one may end up 
with just-identified specifications so that only a limited number of issues can be resolved. For 
example, there may be problems in using the two instruments for institutions and openness 
simultaneously. The reason is that the predicted values of the explanatory variables are   10
typically very collinear, so that inference is unreliable. Also, these instruments for institutions 
and openness are strongly correlated with geography/climate and human capital variables, so 
that it is unclear what is being identified and there is thus plenty of room for disagreement 
about interpretation. For example, on the basis of Sachs (2003) one may argue that settler 
mortality rates capture the historical impact of geography/climate rather than of institutional 
quality installed by colonial settlers. Alternatively, Glaeser and others (2004) argue that settler 
mortality captures human capital of European settlers rather than institutional quality. 
Similarly, the gravity instruments for international trade may simply capture the effects of 
geography on income per capita. Finally, it is almost impossible to resolve the issue of reverse 
causality. An instrument that strongly predicts the determinants of income per capita but has 
no correlation with income per capita itself does not seem available.
11  
Despite all these problems, Table 3a provides IV regressions for the growth in income 
per capita from 1965 to 2000 (i.e., GrowthGDP19652000) where institutional quality is 
instrumented by the logarithm of colonial settler mortality, legal origin and the fraction of the 
population speaking English. Illustrative cross-country regressions provided by IMF (2005) 
indicate that institutional quality is higher for countries that are more open to international 
trade, have a greater accountability of the political executive and perhaps also have fewer 
natural resources, so it makes sense to include openness and natural resource dependence as 
instruments for institutional quality as well. Clearly, including these explanatory variables 
that are supposed to be exogenous also improves the statistical efficiency of the IV estimates. 
The most striking result is that the direct effect of the share of natural resources in 
exports on growth performance initially found by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) is no longer 
statistically significant. Hence, if we use the standard instruments from the empirical literature 
on explaining cross-country variations in national income, the direct natural resource curse 
effect does not survive. The Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005) result on the interaction term 
of natural resources with institutional quality did not hold up with a longer sample period, so 
we should not be too surprised that it does not appear in the IV regressions with the longer 
sample period either. However, IV regressions (11) and (12) do yield an estimate of the 
interaction effect of natural resources with de jure openness with the correct sign, but it is not 
statistically significant. One reason may be that the investment share is endogenous but is 
used de facto as an instrument for institutional quality. This certainly worsens the treatment 
for endogeneity bias. Thus another specification for the growth in income per capita 
regressions could help to alleviate that problem. 
                                                 
11 Rigobon and Rodrick (2004) split their sample into two sub-samples (colonies versus non-colonies 
and continents aligned along an East-West axis versus those aligned on a North-South axis) and exploit 
the differences in structural variance in these sub-samples to identify parameters. They find that 
democracy and especially the rule of law boost incomes per capita, but openness negatively affects 
incomes per capita and democracy and positively affects the rule of law.   11
 
Table 3b presents the IV estimates if both institutional quality (i.e., InstQual80) and openness 
(OPEN6590) are instrumented, where the log of a gravity estimate (lnfrinstex, see Appendix 
A) is used as an instrument for openness. These estimates are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table 3a. 
 
Table 3: IV regressions for growth in income over the period 1965-2000 





(b) Instrumenting both institutional quality and openness  
 
 
4. Cross-country variations in income per capita and natural resource dependence 
The empirical evidence for the negative effect of natural resource exports on growth 
performance is mixed. The OLS regressions suggest that growth is higher in countries that 
Second Stage for grgdpch19652000 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) (16)
InstQual80  6.515  0.380  0.384  0.051 -0.257 0.381 0.138 0.334 1.492 0.125 0.019 0.293 0.304  0.181
(0.32)  (0.87)  (0.73)  (0.15) (0.56) (0.93) (0.41) (0.69) (0.68) (0.35) (0.06) (0.77) (1.00)  (1.12)
logGDP/worker65  -3.786  -0.829  -0.832  -0.289 -0.122 -0.830 -0.282 -0.621 -0.262 -0.258 -0.255 -0.286  -0.545  -0.564  -0.342 -0.309
(0.36)  (2.52)*  (2.10)*  (0.93) (0.32) (2.57)* (0.98) (1.97) (0.46) (0.88) (0.81) (0.98) (2.86)**  (2.81)**  (1.10)  (0.97)
OPEN6590  -8.941  0.344  0.335  1.221 1.705 0.342 1.174 0.789 0.314 1.224 0.716 -0.240  0.544  1.259 
(0.27)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (1.34) (1.57) (0.33) (1.35) (0.80) (0.13) (1.34) (0.58) (0.16) (0.85)  (1.99)* 
PrimExp/GNP  8.842  -3.078  -3.071  -1.624 -2.123 -3.076 2.320 8.642 58.507 3.544 -2.705 3.416 -4.389  2.288 
(0.24)  (1.39)  (1.30)  (0.94) (1.38) (1.38) (0.35) (0.99) (0.48) (0.53) (1.30) (0.59) (2.59)*  (0.28) 
InvShare19702000  -0.327  0.096  0.096  0.114 0.135 0.096 0.112 0.108 0.084 0.115 0.119 0.113 0.132  0.133  0.126  0.135
(0.25)  (2.41)*  (2.19)*  (3.02)** (2.89)** (2.49)* (2.98)** (2.82)** (0.97) (2.95)** (3.19)** (3.26)** (4.68)**  (4.53)**  (3.38)** (4.19)**
Interacti InstQual80  -0.818 -2.500 -12.421 -1.085 -1.493  -0.744 -0.139
(0.52) (1.35) (0.52) (0.68) (0.90) (0.40)  (0.41)
Interact OPEN6590  4.190 9.371 7.193  2.027 
(1.12) (1.25) (2.45)*  (0.86) 
Constant  6.342  5.744  5.750  2.076 1.873 5.746 1.616 3.953 -4.831 1.438 2.011 1.193 4.671  4.186  1.326  1.447
(0.43)  (3.12)** (2.94)** (1.03) (0.89) (3.10)** (0.76) (2.15)* (0.33) (0.69) (0.98) (0.63) (2.94)**  (2.60)*  (0.55)  (0.63)
Observations  54  83  83  54 54 83 54 83 54 54 54 54 92  92  55  55
overid pvalue  0.01 0.01 0.99 0.02 0.54 0.40 0.01 0.03 0.03  0.01  0.04
First Stage for icrge80 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)
logGDP/worker65  0.489  0.710  0.502  0.767 0.316 0.642 0.628 0.642 0.767 0.316 0.606 0.606 0.621  0.575
(2.08)*  (3.81)** (2.74)** (3.03)** (1.28) (2.92)** (2.02)* (2.92)** (3.03)** (1.28) (1.88) (1.88) (1.91)  (2.30)*
OPEN6590  1.528  2.081  2.059  1.164 1.290 2.065 1.126 2.065 1.164 1.290 1.556 1.556
(1.53)  (3.32)** (3.26)** (1.38) (1.37) (3.30)** (1.32) (3.30)** (1.38) (1.37) (1.52) (1.52)
PrimExp/GNP  -1.538  -2.592  -2.090  -2.515 -2.111 -2.565 -2.585 -2.565 -2.515 -2.111 -1.718 -1.718  -2.416
(0.67)  (1.56)  (1.25)  (1.05) (0.76) (1.47) (0.98) (1.47) (1.05) (0.76) (0.49) (0.49) (0.82) 
Inv Share19702000  0.064  0.055  0.069  0.058 0.066 0.058 0.060 0.058 0.058 0.066 0.056 0.056 0.073  0.065
(1.78)  (1.85)  (2.21)*  (1.90) (1.99) (1.85) (1.94) (1.85) (1.90) (1.99) (1.74) (1.74) (3.00)** (2.90)**
logsetmort  -0.077  0.124 -0.017 0.111 0.124 -0.017 0.078 0.078 0.008  -0.101
(0.33)  (0.48) (0.07) (0.41) (0.48) (0.07) (0.28) (0.28)  (0.03) (0.52)
legor_uk  0.714  1.174 0.560 0.931 0.560 1.174 0.935 0.935  1.111  1.108
(2.18)*  (2.55)* (1.33) (1.74) (1.33) (2.55)* (1.75) (1.75)  (2.10)* (2.69)**
engfrac  1.066  1.658 0.454 0.786 0.454 1.658 0.686 0.686  0.783  0.603
(1.67)  (1.69) (0.57) (0.73) (0.57) (1.69) (0.63) (0.63)  (0.70) (0.52)
Interact OPEN6590  -3.275 -3.275 
(0.58) (0.58) 
Constant  0.208  -2.127  -0.405  -3.333 1.342 -1.571 -2.064 -1.571 -3.333 1.342 -1.768 -1.768  -1.585 -0.823
(0.08)  (1.26)  (0.26)  (1.03) (0.47) (0.84) (0.57) (0.84) (1.03) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)  (0.43) (0.29)
Observations  54  83  83  54 54 83 54 83 54 54 54 54 55  60
R-squared  0.45  0.65  0.65  0.52 0.50 0.65 0.53 0.65 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.54  0.49 0.47
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Second Stage for grgdpch19652000 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)
iNST. QUAL.  -159.150  0.281  0.139  -0.584 -0.617 0.250 -0.337 0.137 1.089 -0.170 0.243 0.318 0.304  0.181
(0.02)  (0.46)  (0.17)  (0.62) (0.55) (0.43) (0.57) (0.26) (0.31) (0.30) (0.41) (0.76) (1.00)  (1.12)
OPEN6590  462.576  4.690  4.912  5.987 6.068 4.479 6.041 2.550 1.143 4.020 -4.015 -0.150 0.544  1.259 
(0.02)  (1.31)  (1.23)  (0.76) (0.74) (1.40) (1.13) (1.18) (0.09) (0.75) (0.57) (0.04) (0.85)  (1.99)* 
logGDP/worker65  77.485  -1.229  -1.133  -0.094 -0.077 -1.179 -0.094 -0.702 -0.126 -0.145 -0.228 -0.277 -0.545  -0.564  -0.342  -0.309
(0.02)  (2.24)*  (2.07)*  (0.25) (0.17) (2.41)* (0.27) (2.26)* (0.21) (0.47) (0.63) (1.01) (2.86)**  (2.81)**  (1.10)  (0.97)
PrimExp/GNP  -274.160  -1.523  -1.800  -2.916 -2.972 -1.691 7.638 6.101 52.814 5.968 -6.916 5.328 -4.389  2.288 
(0.02)  (0.53)  (0.66)  (0.99) (0.99) (0.62) (0.57) (0.64) (0.38) (0.55) (1.87) (0.75) (2.59)*  (0.28) 
Inv Share19702000  5.378  -0.026  -0.014  0.057 0.059 -0.015 0.047 0.074 0.098 0.079 0.169 0.112 0.132  0.133  0.126  0.135
(0.02)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.15) (0.48) (1.32) (0.50) (0.83) (1.47) (1.67) (4.68)**  (4.53)**  (3.38)**  (4.19)**
Interact InstQual80  -2.185 -1.907 -11.342 -1.743 -1.883 -0.744  -0.139
(0.72) (0.96) (0.41) (0.68) (1.03) (0.40)  (0.41)
Constant  0.955  9.989  9.721  3.512 3.505 9.656 2.392 5.618 -4.261 1.940 1.055 0.992 4.671  4.186  1.326  1.447
(0.00)  (2.64)*  (2.86)** (0.94) (0.92) (2.91)** (0.94) (2.77)** (0.22) (0.87) (0.28) (0.44) (2.94)**  (2.60)*  (0.55)  (0.63)
Interact OPEN6590  23.356 9.115 7.193  2.027 
(1.50) (1.24) (2.45)*  (0.86) 
Observations  54 83  83  54  54 83 54 83 54 54 54 54 92 92  55  55 
overid pvalue  0.02 0.03 0.82 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01  0.04  12
have good institutions, invest a lot, are open to international trade and have a low initial level 
of income per capita. Furthermore, the OLS estimates suggest that growth is lower in 
countries that are rich in natural resources, especially if they restrict international trade and 
the quality of institutions is poor. Unfortunately, these results do not really stand up if 
institutional quality is instrumented by the logarithm of colonial settler mortality, legal origin, 
and the fraction of the population speaking English. Furthermore, the estimates suggest an 
implausibly slow speed of conditional convergence. To remedy this latter problem, it would 
help to estimate a dynamic panel. However, we suspect that the data are simply not good 
enough yet to obtain satisfactory results. We therefore take a more modest approach and 
attempt to assess whether there is evidence that natural resources have additional explanatory 
power in addition to geography, openness, and institutional quality in explaining cross-
country variations in income. 
 
Figure 1: Direct and indirect effects of natural resources on income per capita 
 
Figure 1 indicates that there are various direct and indirect ways by which resource 
dependence can make a country poorer. The first one (arrow 1) is that natural resources 
provide an open invitation to rapacious rent seeking. The resulting voracity effect lowers 
income per capita. The second one (arrows 4 and 3) is that natural resources worsen the 
adverse impact of bad institutions on income per capita. The third one (arrows 5 and 7) argues 
that the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the decline of the non-resource exposed 
sectors may induce a lobby for more restrictive trade policies (import substitution, subsidies   13
for pet manufacturing companies, etc.) and in this way lower income per capita. Of course, 
just like geography, trade policies/trade openness and the quality of institutions also have a 
direct effect on income per capita (arrows 7 and 3). However, income per capita might also 
affect trade openness and institutional quality (arrows 6 and 2) and therefore it is important to 
look for good instruments (including natural resource dependence) to correct for the 
endogenous nature of these explanatory variables.  
 
4.1. OLS estimates 
Table 4 presents some OLS regressions that attempt to explain cross-country variations in 
income per capita in the year 1995 (i.e., logGDP/cap95 in Appendix A). Regression (2) 
confirms the empirical results of a large number of empirical studies. Cross-country variations 
in income per capita are well explained by geography, institutions and de facto openness. If a 
country is close to the equator, has limited rule of law, and is not much exposed to 
international trade, it is more likely to have low income per capita. In line with the horse race 
conducted by Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) we find that institutional quality is the 
most important explanation of income per capita. However, regression (3) indicates that, even 
once we control for geography, institutions, and openness, natural resource exports in 1965 
have a strong additional negative impact on income per capita. This gives empirical support 
for a significant natural resource curse effect at the 5% significance level. 
Regressions (4) and (5) suggest that there is no evidence of significant interaction 
terms of natural resources with rule of law or openness. To avoid problems arising from 
collinearity of openness and institutional quality, regressions (6) and (7) try them one at a 
time. Regression (6) indicates that there is no evidence for a significant interaction term of the 
rule of law with natural resource dependence. If we drop the rule of law as an explanatory 
variable, regression (7) suggests that there is still no evidence of a significant interaction term 
of openness with natural resource dependence. The preferred regression of Table 4 is thus (3). 
If the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria were not so dependent on natural resources, 
they would be better off. In that case, regression (3) implies that their income per capita 
would, respectively, be 372 percent and 205 percent higher everything else being equal.   14
 
4.2. IV estimates 
Rule of law and de facto openness suffer from endogeneity bias. Hence, we instrument them 
with combinations of UK legal origin, log of settler mortality, fraction of population speaking 
English, and a bilateral gravity estimate of openness. Explanatory variables that do not suffer 
from endogeneity bias are also included in the set of instruments. Hence, natural resource 
exports are also an instrument for openness and rule of law. This is important for obtaining 
consistent estimates, because Figure 2 indicates that the rule of law indicator and the ratio of 
natural resource exports (or natural capital) to national income are highly negatively 
correlated. 
Table 5 presents the IV regressions for cross-country variations in income per capita 
in 1995 (i.e., logGDP/cap95). Although the core regression that explains cross-country 
variations in income by geography, institutions and openness survives in the IV estimates, 
there appears to be a significant additional negative effect of natural resource exports in 
regressions (2) and (3) at the 5 percent level. However, rule of law is no longer statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level, while openness is at least significant in regression (2) and 
distance to the equator is of the right sign albeit statistically insignificant. Also, when using 
more instruments than endogenous variables, the over-identification tests suggest that we 
cannot rely on regressions (2) or (3). Regression (1) suggests that cross-country variations in 
income are explained by distance to the equator and possibly de facto openness and a resource 
curse. Regressions (4)-(6) indicate there is no evidence for interaction effects of natural 
resource exports with institutional quality and de facto openness. 
 
Table 4. OLS Regressions for Income Per Capita 1995 with Log of Natural Resource Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DISTEQ 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.027
(4.02)** (3.60)** (1.91) (1.90) (1.83) (2.05)* (5.19)**
RL01 0.823 0.635 0.535 0.506 0.419 0.591
(12.08)** (8.00)** (4.66)** (2.35)* (1.70) (2.60)*
LNOPEN 0.348 0.455 0.450 0.629 0.879
(4.31)** (4.26)** (4.05)** (2.32)* (3.34)**
ln PrimExp/GNP -0.218 -0.212 -0.126 -0.069 -0.220
(2.81)** (2.45)* (0.86) (0.84) (1.81)
Interact LNOPEN 0.066 0.050
(0.73) (0.60)
Constant 7.916 8.344 8.081 8.084 8.310 7.842 8.109
(73.00)** (55.66)** (40.51)** (40.20)** (22.39)** (39.09)** (22.80)**
Interact RL01 -0.013 -0.048 -0.095
(0.16) (0.53) (1.19)
Observations 139 131 98 98 98 101 99
R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.71
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.  15
Figure 2: Correlation between rule of law and natural resource exports 
 
 
5. Natural capital as an explanatory variable 
Given the disappointing results of our IV estimates of the negative effect of natural resource 
exports on income per capita, it may be worthwhile to use the estimates of natural capital for 
2000 developed by the World Bank (2006b) to explain income per capita in 1995. Natural 
Table 5. IV Income Per Capita 1995 Regressions Using Log of Natural Resource Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RL01 0.222 0.226 0.458 -0.323 0.481 20.894
(0.64) (0.69) (1.69) (0.55) (1.38) (0.28)
DISTEQ 0.027 0.017 0.013 0.020 0.014 -0.354
(2.18)* (1.28) (1.60) (1.42) (1.77) (0.28)
ln PrimExp/GNP -0.193 -0.504 -0.232 -0.474 -0.209 -4.407
(1.86) (2.27)* (2.39)* (2.09)* (1.76) (0.24)
LNOPEN 0.408 1.329 0.518 1.292 0.431 -18.368
(1.28) (3.28)** (1.83) (3.33)** (1.72) (0.24)
Interact LNOPEN -4.118
(0.24)
Constant 7.755 8.573 8.089 8.512 8.012 -5.159
(21.05)** (30.21)** (31.52)** (29.50)** (30.78)** (0.09)
Interact RL01 -0.220 -0.002 3.767
(1.40) (0.01) (0.26)
Observations 98 65 98 65 98 65
overid pvalue 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Instruments 1/
RL01 legor_uk logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac legor_uk, engfrac logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac legor_uk, engfrac logsetmort
LNOPEN  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex
Robust t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
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Figure: Rule of Law and Natural Resource Exports as a share of GDP
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Logarithm of Natural Capital over GNI (year 2000)
Figure: Rule of Law and Natural Capital over GNI
Data source: see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) & World Bank (2006)  16
capital effectively corresponds to an estimate of the total stock of sub-soil assets, timber, non-
timber forest resources, protected areas, cropland and pastureland, all suitably corrected for 
the renewable nature of resources when relevant. One might argue that natural capital over 
Gross National Income (GNI) better captures natural resource abundance than natural 
resource exports as a share of GNI, which may suffer from endogeneity bias. Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte (2006) argue that natural resource exports indicators often used in the resource 
curse literature capture resource dependence rather than resource abundance. A stock variable 
may be more appropriate for explaining income per capita than a flow variable like natural 
resource exports, since it can capture forward-looking expectations of government and the 
private sector about future natural resource revenues. Using natural capital as an explanatory 
variable also has the advantage that it is available for a larger number of countries.
12 
 
5.1. OLS regressions with de facto openness 
Table 6 presents the results from the OLS regressions. Interestingly, the log of natural capital 
always has a negative impact on income per capita and is significant at the 5% level in all 
regressions except (5).
13  Regressions (1) and especially (2) are again the core regression 
results that confirm that institutions, openness, and geography determine cross-country 
variations in income. Regression (3) indicates that the log of natural capital depresses income 
per capita even after allowing for the effects of distance to the equator, rule of law, and de 
facto openness. Regression (4) shows that there is no evidence of an interaction effect of 
natural capital with rule of law and regression (6) indicates that this is the case even if 
openness is dropped. This suggests that the disastrous consequences of rapacious rent seeking 
on growth are mainly elicited through natural resource export revenues rather than by how 
much oil, gas or other resources are underground. However, regression (5) shows that the 
interaction term of natural capital with openness is significant at the 5% level. To avoid 
collinearity of rule of law and de facto openness, regression (7) drops the rule of law as an 
explanatory variable and now finds that at the 5 percent level natural capital has a significant 
negative effect on and a significant interaction term with openness. The results thus suggest 
that income per capita is high for countries that are far from the equator and relatively open. 
There is evidence for a resource curse in the sense that natural resource abundance harms 
income per capita. Furthermore, this resource curse is less severe for more open economies. 
                                                 
12 Stijns (2005) uses the reserves of oil, gas, coal, minerals and land to test for the adverse effect of 
resource abundance on growth. He finds this is only the case for land, which correlates (in contrast to 
oil, gas, and minerals) with bad institutions and bad policies. He also stresses that the ability to turn the 
curse into a blessing depends on the nature of the learning process. Unfortunately, Stijns (2005) does 
not control for investment rates or the initial level of GDP per capita. 
13 This is in contrast to Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2006), who find a direct positive effect of resource 
abundance and an indirect effect of resource dependence (through worsening of institutional quality) 
on growth performance.   17
However, even for the most open countries of our sample, openness does not turn resource 
abundance into a blessing for income per capita. 
 
 
5.2. IV regressions with de facto openness 
In order to make inferences about the causality of the relationship between natural capital and 
income per capita, Table 7 corrects for the endogenous nature of de facto openness and 
institutional quality and presents the resulting IV estimates. Apart from regression (4), the log 
of natural capital has a negative impact on income per capita. This impact is significant in 
regressions (1) and (2). There is no evidence of an interaction effect of natural capital with 
institutional quality. Furthermore, although the interaction effect of natural capital with de 
facto openness has the right sign in regressions (4) and (7), it is not significant at the 5 percent 
level.  
 
Table 7: IV income per capita regressions 1995 using log of natural capital 
 
 
Table 6. OLS Income Per Capita 1995 Regressions Using Log of Natural Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DISTEQ 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.024
(4.02)** (3.60)** (2.69)** (2.72)** (3.01)** (2.55)* (6.27)**
RL01 0.823 0.635 0.456 0.437 0.511 0.580
(12.08)** (8.00)** (4.10)** (3.77)** (4.38)** (5.32)**
LNOPEN 0.348 0.276 0.277 0.101 0.313
(4.31)** (2.92)** (2.93)** (0.88) (3.17)**
lnNatCapital/GNI -0.198 -0.209 0.018 -0.234 -0.168
(3.10)** (3.14)** (0.17) (3.42)** (2.49)*
interact LNOPEN 0.201 0.149
(2.56)* (2.60)*
Constant 7.916 8.344 8.476 8.505 8.309 8.184 8.442
(73.00)** (55.66)** (49.42)** (47.51)** (43.65)** (55.75)** (53.75)**
Interact RL01 0.031 -0.066 0.026
(0.60) (1.06) (0.50)
Observations 139 131 106 106 106 106 112
R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.71
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
RL01  0.116  0.201  1.278 0.861 1.092 1.064 
(0.25)  (0.37)  (2.89)** (2.11)* (4.75)** (4.95)** 
DISTEQ  0.023  0.025  -0.015 0.010 -0.007 -0.008  0.029
(2.05)*  (1.81)  (0.78) (0.94) (0.63) (0.67)  (4.43)**
lnNatCapital/GNI  -0.404  -0.475  -0.163 0.769 -0.166 -0.159  -0.381
(2.29)*  (2.00)*  (1.60) (1.66) (1.65) (1.65)  (1.56)
LNOPEN  -0.358  -0.262 0.046 -0.329
(0.77)  (0.55) (0.13) (0.76)
Interact LNOPEN  0.685 0.133
(1.93) (1.00)
Constant  8.033  7.598  8.394 8.076 8.584 8.610  7.663
(42.29)**  (11.93)**  (18.68)** (17.05)** (35.42)** (36.11)**  (11.97)**
Interact RL01  0.010 -0.561 -0.016 0.029 
(0.08) (1.78) (0.14) (0.28) 
Observations  106  106  62 106 62 62  112
R-squared  0.66  0.54  0.43 0.55 0.55 0.55  0.56
overid pvalue  0.15 0.36 0.15 0.08 
Instruments 1/ 
RL01   legor_uk legor_uk   logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac legor_uk, engfrac logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac logsetmort, engfrac 
LNOPEN   lnfrinstex   lnfrinstex   lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables.  18
5.3.  Natural capital and de jure trade openness 
To enable comparison with Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), we check the robustness of our 
results to using de jure rather than de facto openness as an explanatory variable. Table 8 
presents the resulting OLS regressions. All regressions show evidence of a significant 
negative effect at the 5 percent level of the log of the ratio of natural capital to GNI on income 
per capita. Income per capita clearly rises with distance from the equator, the rule of law and 
de jure openness, but regression (3) shows that there is in addition a strong and significant 
resource curse effect at the 5 percent level even after controlling for these standard 
explanations of income per capita. Regression (4) gives weak evidence at the 10 percent level 
for a significant interaction effect of natural capital with rule of law, which suggests that the 
resource curse is less severe for countries with good institutions. Both institutional quality and 
trade policy indicators may reflect the willingness of the government to adopt good policies 
toward domestic and foreign investors and trade partners. Indeed, to avoid issues of multi-
collinearity regression (7) drops the rule of law and its interaction with natural capital. There 
is then evidence of a significant interaction term of natural capital with de jure openness. 
Hence, if a country abandons trade restrictions, the resource curse seems to be less severe.
14 
 
Table 8: OLS income per capita regressions with natural capital and de jure openness 
 
 
To correct for the possible endogenous character of de jure openness and rule of law, Table 9 
presents some IV regressions. There is always a negative effect of the log of the ratio of 
natural capital to national income, but it is only significant at the 5 percent level in regressions 
                                                 
14 Indeed regression (7) in Table 8 indicates that the resource curse is attenuated by a higher degree of 
de jure openness. However, according to that regression, the curse can not be turned into a blessing. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)
DISTEQ  0.027 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.016  0.012 0.025
(6.65)** (2.53)* (3.01)** (3.26)**  (3.32)**  (2.55)* (5.91)**
lnNatCapital/GNI  -0.416 -0.224 -0.178 -0.201  -0.317  -0.234 -0.420
(8.26)** (3.43)** (2.55)* (2.86)**  (2.99)**  (3.42)** (4.61)**
RL01  0.596 0.435 0.326 0.397  0.580
(5.74)** (3.64)** (2.46)*  (2.83)**  (5.32)**
OPEN6590  0.529 0.694 0.511  0.839
(2.43)* (2.97)**  (1.94)  (4.21)**
Interact OPEN6590  0.291  0.352
(1.45)  (2.64)**
Constant  7.941 8.160 7.910 7.940 8.029  8.184 7.809
(60.51)** (59.07)** (45.44)** (45.95)** (44.02)** (55.75)** (44.74)**
Interact RL01  0.103 0.005  0.026
(1.81) (0.05)  (0.50)
Observations  113 106 100 100 100  106 100
R-squared  0.63 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.77  0.72 0.74
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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(1), (3) and (4). The regressions indicate that there is no evidence of a significant interaction 
term of natural capital with institutional quality. Furthermore, in regressions (3)-(6) this term 
has the wrong sign. However, there is some evidence of a significant interaction term of 
natural capital with de jure openness. Trade policies directed toward more exposure to foreign 
competition and transfer of technology and managerial skills can thus weaken the resource 
curse and even transform it into a blessing for those countries with a sufficiently high degree 
of de jure openness.
15 
 
Table 9: IV income per capita regressions with natural capital and de jure openness 
 
 
6. Robustness: different measures of institutional quality  
Tables 10 and 11 present the IV regressions that explain income per capita in terms of 
distance to the equator, de facto trade openness, and expropriation risk or corruption (both 
obtained from the International Country Risk Guide) as alternative measures of institutional 
quality to rule of law.
16 Interestingly, the results also suggest a natural resource curse  as there 
is some evidence for a significant negative effect at the 5% level of the log of the ratio of 
natural capital over gross national income on income per capita even after controlling for the 
effects of geography and these alternative measures of institutional quality. However, Figure 
3 displays a strong correlation between expropriation risk/corruption and natural capital. This 
suggests that natural resources have an adverse effect on income per capita through a 
worsening of institutional quality as illustrated by arrow 4 combined with arrow 3 in Figure 1. 
Furthermore, we find weak evidence of cross-country correlation between natural resource 
abundance and inflation.
17  One reason might be that averaging over a long period might 
                                                 
15 In fact, regressions (3) and (4) of Table 9 imply that the resource curse is turned into a blessing 
thanks to a high degree of de jure openness for the following countries: Australia, Bolivia, Barbados, 
Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mauritius, Malaysia, United States. 
16  Knack and Keefer (1995) also use a variety of alternative measures of institutional quality to 
empirically examine the relationship between institutions and growth using cross-country data. 
17  The cross-correlations between inflation over the period 1970 to 1990 and logarithm of natural 
resources exports over GNI in 1965 or the logarithm of natural capital over GNI in 2000 equal 6 per 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
RL01  0.116  0.242  3.207 2.572 2.470 1.092 
(0.25)  (0.35)  (1.98) (1.10) (1.21) (4.75)** 
DISTEQ  0.023  0.010  -0.045 -0.028 -0.031 -0.007  0.026
(2.05)*  (0.54)  (1.14) (0.50) (0.69) (0.63)  (1.85)
llnNatCapital/GNI  -0.404  0.005  -1.234 -1.337 -1.025 -0.166  -1.171
(2.29)*  (0.04)  (2.05)* (2.08)* (1.40) (1.65)  (1.46)
OPEN6590  2.150  -3.147 -2.394 -1.696 1.644
(1.59)  (1.13) (0.61) (0.45) (0.30)
Interact OPEN6590  3.110 3.274 2.722 2.588
(2.12)* (2.00) (1.60) (0.80)
Constant  8.033  7.672  10.440 10.010 9.793 8.584  8.381
(42.29)**  (11.89)**  (6.70)** (4.79)** (5.02)** (35.42)**  (5.97)**
Interact RL01  0.289  -1.201 -1.118 -0.857 -0.016 
(1.36)  (1.60) (1.24) (0.92) (0.14) 
Observations  106  59  59 59 59 62  100
R-squared  0.66  0.52  -0.03 0.10 0.10 0.55  -0.15
overid pvalue  0.19  0.85 0.58 0.83 0.15 
Instruments 1/ 
RL01   legor_uk  logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac   logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac logsetmort, legor_uk logsetmort, engfrac logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac 
OPEN6590   lnfrinstex   lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables.  20
smooth out the variation. Thus, further investigation of the empirical relationship between 
inflation and resource abundance using time series variation is needed. However, the high 
correlation (in absolute terms) between institutional quality and resource abundance suggests 
that resource abundance affects income per capita directly (affecting directly a nation's 
incentives to improve economic performance) and through damaging institutions and not 
necessarily through the so-called Dutch disease channel. The regressions in Tables 10 and 11 
again provide mixed evidence of an interaction effect of natural resources with expropriation 
risk or corruption. However, there is again evidence for an interaction effect of natural capital 
with openness.  
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Figure: Expropriation Risk and Natural Capital over GNI
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Figure: Corruption and Natural Capital over GNI 
Data source: see La Porta et al. (1997) & Sachs and Warner (1997)
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
cent and  9 per cent, respectively. In future work we will investigate the empirical relationship between 
volatility in the real exchange rate and resource abundance.   21
Table 10: IV income per capita regressions using expropriation risk index 
 
Table 11: IV income per capita regressions using corruption index 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
In our empirical work we focussed on the effects of natural resources on growth performance 
and cross-country variations in income per capita and paid particular attention to how natural 
resources might hamper economic performance through institutions and bad policies. We 
have four main findings. First, we find that the evidence of a resource curse based on OLS 
growth regressions used in the resource curse literature does not survive the use of 
instrumental variables techniques. Second, using income per capita-type regressions and 
instrumenting for institutional quality and openness, we find evidence of a negative direct 
effect of natural resource exports on income per capita even after controlling for geography, 
openness and institutional quality. Third, we find that the conclusion of Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik (2005) that the natural resource curse can be turned into a blessing for countries with 
good institutions is not robust to the use of instrumental variables techniques. We do find that 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)
EXPRORISK  0.075  0.565  0.129  0.510 0.349 0.608 0.368 
(0.26)  (4.38)**  (0.40)  (4.16)** (3.32)** (3.49)**  (3.71)** 
DISTEQ  0.024  0.006  0.025  0.010 0.016 0.006 0.013  0.029
(1.71)  (0.82)  (1.44)  (1.73) (2.30)* (0.79) (1.74)  (4.43)**
lnNatCapital/GNI  -0.369  -0.241  -0.442 -0.197 -0.503 0.458 -0.631  -0.381
(2.54)*  (1.78)  (1.99)* (1.58) (1.31) (0.56) (1.37)  (1.56)
LNOPEN  -0.339 0.393 0.589 -0.652 -0.329
(0.75)  (1.59) (2.64)* (1.43) (0.76)
Interact LNOPEN  0.537 0.133
(2.19)* (1.00)
Constant  7.511  4.492  6.746  5.319 6.577 3.324 5.742  7.663
(4.19)**  (4.68)**  (3.18)** (4.93)** (8.57)** (1.91) (8.06)**  (11.97)**
Interact EXPRORISK  0.048 0.012 0.054 
(0.80) (0.13) (0.70) 
Observations  91  53  91  53 53 53 53  112
overid pvalue  0.06  0.11 0.11 0.31 0.14 
Instruments 1/ 
RL01   legor_uk logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac   legor_uk logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac  logsetmort, legor_uk, engfrac logsetmort, engfrac  logsetmort, legor_uk 
OPEN6590   lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex   lnfrinstex
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables.
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
CORRUPT  0.082  0.128  0.418 0.208 0.354 
(0.28)  (0.43)  (3.61)** (0.77) (2.90)** 
DISTEQ  0.021  0.020  0.003 0.017 0.004  0.029
(0.94)  (0.81)  (0.19) (1.04) (0.32)  (4.43)**
lnNatCapital/GNI  -0.378  -0.437  1.363 0.374 -0.737  -0.381
(2.64)**  (1.90)  (1.10) (0.28) (1.13)  (1.56)
LNOPEN  -0.270  -1.895 0.194 -0.329
(0.59)  (1.01) (0.55) (0.76)
Interact LNOPEN  1.759 0.471 0.133
(1.92) (2.69)** (1.00)
Constant  7.666  7.141  3.793 7.434 6.657  7.663
(6.21)**  (5.83)**  (1.45) (3.94)** (10.47)**  (11.97)**
Interact CORRUPT  0.189 -0.006 0.091 
(0.82) (0.03) (0.63) 
Observations  90  90  53 90 53  112 
overid pvalue  0.74 0.16 0.10 
Instruments 1/ 
RL01   legor_uk  legor_uk  logsetmort, legor_uk legor_uk, engfrac  logsetmort, legor_uk 
OPEN6590   lnfrinstex   lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex  lnfrinstex
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables.   22
trade policies directed toward more openness can make the resource curse less severe and 
may even turn it into a blessing. Fourth, ours are robust to use of different various indicators 
of institutional quality such as the risk of expropriation or the degree of corruption. If we use 
natural resource abundance rather than dependence, we also find evidence of a natural 
resource curse after controlling for geography, institutions, and openness. Furthermore, we 
find that this resource curse is attenuated if countries pursue more liberal trade policies. 
  Bad trade policies are very correlated with bad fiscal policies. Resource booms may 
make it easier to boost public sector employment and investment and subsidies geared 
towards import substitution in order to win votes and satisfy befriended interest groups. This  
undoubtedly harms economic performance. It is therefore likely that bad policies in general 
are likely to aggravate a resource curse and good policies may turn a resource boom into a 
blessing. In future work it will be important to distinguish between point-based and diffuse 
natural resources. The former are typically associated with capital-intensive extraction and 
concentrated ownership while the rents associated with the latter are more widely dispersed. 
The idea is that point-based resources are more prone to rapacious rent seeking and the 
resource curse (e.g., Auty, 2001; Isham et al., 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; 
Murshed, 2004; and Lay and Mahmoud, 2004). In future work it will also be interesting to 
investigate further whether and through which channels the notorious volatility of natural 
resource prices harms economic growth. One way this might occur is that the resulting 
volatility in real exchange rates has an adverse effect on investment, learning, and growth, but 
Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) find no evidence for this. However, Ramey and 
Ramey (1995) do provide cross-country evidence that volatility harms growth. The 
underlying cause being that poor countries engaged in excessive borrowing when resource 
prices were low and suffered from a financial crisis when resource prices rose again. In future 
work it will also be important to pay more attention to how natural resources induce war and 
strife, as documented by Collier and Hoeffler (2004),
18 and thus frustrate growth. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Category Variable  Mnemonic  Source 
average annual percentage growth rate of 
real GDP per capita between 1965 and 
2000 (constant prices: chain series) 
GrowthGDP19652000  Heston Summers and 








average annual percentage growth rate in 
real GDP per person between 1965 and 
1990 
GrowthGDP6590 Sachs  and  Warner 
(1997) 
log of real gross domestic product per 
capita (international $ in current prices) 
in 1995. 
logGDP/cap95  Heston Summers and 
Aten PWT 6.1 (2002) 
log of real GDP chain per worker in 1965 
(in I$ worker in 1996 constant prices) 
logGDP/worker65  Heston Summers and 
Aten PWT 6.1 (2002) 
Initial income 
log of GDP per capita in 1965  logGDP/cap65 Sachs  and  Warner 
(1997) 
percentage investment share of RGDPL 
averaged over 1970-2000 (in 1996 
constant prices) 
InvShare19702000  Heston Summers and 
Aten PWT 6.1 (2002) 
Investment 
share 
ratio of real gross investment to real GDP 
over 1970 to 1989 
InvRate7089 Sachs and Warner 
(1997) 
fraction of years during 1965-90 in which 
country is rated open (de jure measure) 
OPEN6590 Sachs  and  Warner 
(1997) 
log of average (exports+imports)/GDP, 
measured in constant 1985 US dollars.   
LNOPEN Dollar  and  Kraay 
(2002) 
average de facto openness in constant 
prices during the period 1965-2000 (in % 
in 1996 constant prices) 
openk6500  Heston Summers and 
Aten PWT 6.1 (2002) 
Openness 
log of extended version of Frankel and 
Romer (1999) instrument. 
lnfrinstex Dollar  and  Kraay 
(2002) 
share of exports of primary products in 
GNP in 1970 
PrimExp/GNP Sachs  and  Warner 
(1997) 
average natural resource exports over 
GDP 
Natrsgdpav World  Bank  (2006a) 
Resource 
abundance 
natural logarithm of natural capital 2000, 
in thousand of US $ over GNI (in current 
US $ 2000) 
lnNatCapital/GNI  World Bank (2006b)  
rule of law 2000/2001  RL01  Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002) 
institutional quality index (rule of law, 
level of bureaucracy, risk of 
expropriation, government repudiation) 
InstQual80 ICRG,  Sachs  and 
Warner (1997) 
log settler mortality  logsetmort  La Porta et al. (2004) 
expropriation risk  EXPRORISK  La Porta et al. (2004) 
corruption index (ICRG)  CORRUPT  La Porta et al. (1999) 
fraction of population speaking English.  engfrac  Hall and Jones (1999). 
Institutions 
legal origin – British  legor_UK  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Geography distance  from  equator, measured as 
absolute value of latitude of capital city. 




Appendix B: Estimation of effects of natural resources on economic growth 
Following Solow (1956), we postulate a Cobb-Douglas production function  
.. 1 ( )     with    /   and   / , YKA L L Ln A A αα γ − == =    28
where  Y,  K,  L and A indicate output, capital, labour supply and efficiency of labour, 
respectively, and a constant saving rate s. Hence, capital accumulation is given by: 
.
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )    with    /  etc. Ks Y n Ks K n K KK A L α γδ γδ = − ++ = − ++ ≡  
Rewriting in terms of the logarithm of national income in efficiency units, we obtain: 
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The adjustment speed λ is high if the share of capital α is low and the rates of population 
growth n and labour-augmenting technical progress γ are high. The time to close half the gap 
is T = log(2)/λ. Steady-state income per capita is high if the saving rate s is high and the 
population growth rate n small, and grows at the rate of technical progress γ: 
  log( ( )/ ( ))* log( ) [log( ) log( )]. 0 1










This expression explains cross-country variations in per capita income. To avoid too much 
noise, assume γ is the same for all countries. The term a0 reflects technology, resource 
endowments, climate, geography, and institutional quality, among others and differs across 
countries. With a constant steady-state level of output in efficiency units, we have: 
( )= ( )+(1 ) log( ( )) log( )} + ( - ) or 21 1 2 1 1
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Growth performance thus rises one for one with the rate of labour-augmenting technical 
progress, depends negatively on initial income per capita and population growth, and 
positively on the saving rate. Growth also depends through a(t1) on technology, resource 
endowments, climate, geography, and institutional quality, among others. One can then 
calculate 
11 21 )1 . 0 1 ( ) /100 1  and  0< = /( tt κ θ κα κ κ + < <= − − <  This  implies 
21 0 100/( ) tt κ << − . Also,  
21 log( ) /( ) and  log(2) / . tt T λ θλ =− − =  
 
Cross-country regressions yield biased estimates of θ, since they ignore the correlation of the 
initial level of productivity with past income per capita. This correlation is likely to be   29
positive, so the omitted variable bias will be positive. Hence, cross-country regressions over-
estimate  θ, underestimate κ and under-estimate the speed of adjustment λ. They also 
overestimate α. Following Islam (1995), one could estimate the logarithm of income/capita at 
time 2 as a panel regression with a lagged dependent variable: 
12     11 2
ˆˆ where    log( ( )/ ( )) log( ( )), log( ( ), 22 211 1
1 log( ) log( ),   ( ),   (1 )log( (0)), t 21i
and the coefficients are 0< exp(
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Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro and Lee (1993), and Hall and Jones 
(1999), one can avoid a too high estimate of α and also put in (steady-state) human capital h 
by setting xit
2 ≡ log(h) and θ2 ≡ ωθ1/α where ω is the share of human capital in value added. 
Unscrambling the speed of adjustment and the shares of physical capital and human capital: 
     
1 12 log( ),       and    = .
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One can use least squares regression with dummies for the country effects if one assumes that 
these individual country effects do not change with time. In that case, resource abundance is 
typically no longer statistically significant. An alternative is to use a minimum distance 
estimator after specifying the fixed country effects μi as function of the variables to which it is 
thought to be correlated. For example, the fixed country effects may depend on the vector xi
3 
which may include the quality of institutions (such as corruption or rule of law), 
geography/climate, and resource abundance. We can thus estimate the panel: 
   
3
12 3
12 ˆ , 1 yy x x x t it it it i it it θ θθ θ ν ε =+ ++ + + −  
where the hat indicates the predicted value of the vector xi
3 from regressions with appropriate 
instruments. Since Easterly and Levine (2005) suggest that geography and climate mainly 
affect the country fixed effects through institutions, one could include an interaction term of 
those variables with institutions. We leave panel data estimation for further research. 
 